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0. Introduction
Communication is probably the most ubiquitous social phenomenon and the primary means through which social interaction occurs. This paper aims to develop a theory of communication that surpasses problems with two of the most influential views on the philosophical market. It does this, primarily, through the introduction and explication of a “representational core”, which combines the virtues of both causal reference-fixing stories and concept-fixing descriptions, with none (or at least, less) of their respective pitfalls.
The first view, neo-descriptivism, perhaps most rigorously advanced by Frank Jackson (1998; 2000; 2004) suggests that competent speakers of a natural language must assent to a shared set of descriptive meanings associated with a linguistic token. It is through these descriptive meanings that the property picked out by a term can be identified (they fix the reference of the term), and the descriptive meanings are also shared by other competent users of the term, and thus conveyed through communication.​[1]​  However, understanding competence with a public term in terms of shared knowledge rests upon controversial psychological assumptions, and grounding communication in shared reference-fixing content runs into problems with interpersonal variance when speakers seem to engage in communicative acts whilst diverging in the beliefs, dispositions and inferences that are associated with the same linguistic term. This suggests that it is possible for speakers to possess the same concept, and thus engage in univocal conversation about a subject matter, whilst assenting to substantively diverging descriptive meanings.
An alternative position, defended by Jerry Fodor (1998) is a ‘locking’ theory, which suggests that concept possession can be grounded in contextual links between speakers and properties. Whilst the position is able to deal with the divergence of roles different speakers associate with their terms, it fails to account for the epistemic access that speakers have to the subject matter under discussion. In this case, it is unclear how we can tell when speakers are appropriately ‘locked on’ to the same set of properties. 
In essence, our charge is that the conditions upon communication are less substantive than the neo-descriptivist account requires and the conditions upon reference-fixing are more substantive than those provided by the locking view. More specifically, in order to avoid the aforementioned ‘which-properties-speakers-lock-on’ problem, we focus on the process of concept acquisition and establish a more robust causal relation between mind and world (concepts and their referents).  At the same time, we suggest a way to avoid the problems that neo-descriptivist views face by appealing to conceptual individuation conditions. Namely, we suggest that the shareability of a specific set of inferences, or dispositions to infer, is not a prerequisite for conceptual shareability. Instead, partial overlap between the constituent parts of a given concept (see below) of two individuals should suffice to establish grounds for communication. In the interest of avoiding making individuation conditions too liberal, we flesh out the minimum conditions for communication in terms of individuation conditions and cognitive content (the connections of a given concept to other concepts). Statistical co-occurrence of properties across instances of a given kind allows for the shareability of concepts and in turn enables communication. 
In §1, we briefly outline the key problematic in this debate; in §2 we suggest a way to avoid the problems that proponents of the locking view face. Finally, we try to accommodate the problems of neo-descriptivist accounts (§3). 

1. The Current Debate
Whilst the contours of the debate are well-known, we rehearse them briefly here for the sake of identifying the specific innovations of the view suggested in §2. For neo-descriptivism, it is essential for communication that speakers grasp the meaning of their terms in order for that content to be conveyed and shared with interlocutors (see Stalnaker 1984, ch.1; Jackson 2000, 331). Roughly, representational content constitutes (or partly constitutes) the way in which a speaker thinks about a certain subject matter, and so represents the world as being. And, according to Jackson, it is a form of descriptive meaning associated with linguistic terms that captures this kind of content. It is accessibility to this descriptive meaning that must be possessed by all interlocutors in order to ground successful communication (i.e., the process during which a speaker successfully conveys what she intended to the hearer).  
Descriptive meaning was traditionally thought to result from treating a term t as a non-rigidified description D, where an entity x is the referent of t iff x is uniquely D. There are, however, well known and influential arguments against this kind of descriptivism suggested by Kripke (1980); Putnam (1975); Byrne and Pryor 2006; Block and Stalnaker 1999; Nimtz 2004, on the basis that counterexamples can be found to practically any determinable candidate for descriptive reference-fixing criteria. Neo-descriptivism suggests, in response, that descriptive meanings are implicit, and may only be revealed in a speaker’s use of a term across hypothetical scenarios. For example, competent users of a term have an implicit ability to evaluate conditionals such as the following:​[2]​
(E) If D, then <water = H2O> 
(Where D witnesses a set of empirical circumstances).

	It is this ability that allows a speaker to articulate the descriptive meaning associated with their terms, and is purportedly bestowed upon a speaker simply in virtue of possessing the relevant concepts.​[3]​ When it comes to communication, Jackson argues that it is highly plausible that, even if speakers cannot fully articulate the reference-fixing properties associated with a term, they must nonetheless have an implicit grasp of those properties ensuring that the term has the referent it does:

Genuine […] disagreement, as opposed to mere talking past one another, requires a background of shared […] opinion to fix a common, or near enough common, set of meanings for our […] terms. We can think of the rather general principles that we share as the commonplaces or platitudes or constitutive principles that make up the core we need to share in order to count as speaking a common […] language.

There are a number of issues that may be identified with this account. One straightforward problem with this view is that the data that psychologists have uncovered about human categorization looks to be in conflict with the suggestion that concepts can be represented by precise conditions (e.g. Murphy 2002). These, now widely accepted, results suggest that categorization is rather a loose matter, in which some members of a category are considered to be more typical of that category than others, and some members more similar to other categories. This poses a straightforward problem for neo-descriptivism. For example, the inferences that you are disposed to make in accord with possessing the concept dog are supposed to determine the meaning of the term “dog”, whilst the corresponding inferences associated with cat will determine the meaning of “cat”. The worry is that, since our categorizations are not sharply defined, there is a need to say that only some of the inferences will determine meaning, and presumably those which are at the “core” in defining the terms. The problem lies in determining where to draw the line between those inferences which are constitutive of meaning and those which are not. This poses difficulties in determining whether or not two people share the same concept, since clearly, at least some of the inferences that we accept for many concepts will be idiosyncratic, and some of the beliefs associated with our concepts are quite likely to be false.​[4]​
Further still, it is crucial to the neo-descriptivist approach that possessing a concept involves accepting a specific range of beliefs and inferences. However, there is reason to think that making assent to an actual set of inferences or dispositions necessary for competence with a term is both untenable and unnecessary, for reasons independent of Quinean holism. Plausibly, having a concept involves only that one can think thoughts involving that concept. So, a thinker x can be said to possess a concept c iff x has the ability to exercise c in her thoughts. It is also natural to say that possessing a concept is a necessary condition for understanding a term, so that, a thinker possessing a concept c expressed by a linguistic term t will be in a position to make certain inferences involving t, to communicate with t, and so on. 
	The neo-descriptivist, however, suggests that understanding a public term t should bring with it a commitment to endorse a specific set of inferences, abilities, beliefs, or dispositions to infer, comprising the epistemic content grasped by a speaker, which explains the possessor’s ability to express knowledge of a true proposition involving the term.
	In distinction with the neo-descriptivist, it seems possible for a thinker to possess a concept, and to have a propositional attitude with that concept as constituent, whilst having an insufficient ability to fix essential elements of that concept’s application conditions. Putnam (1975) showed that a speaker (X) can possess the concept elm and have an ability to represent and think about properties relating to elm trees in certain favorable circumstances, yet fail to have any substantive discriminatory ability. Putnam, (and later Tyler Burge (1979)) convincingly argued that this is the case even if that thinker cannot distinguish between beech and elm trees, since a thinker could possess concepts that are vague or inaccurate:​[5]​ it is possible to be a competent concept user whilst entertaining idiosyncratic beliefs that substantially diverge from the prevailing beliefs falling under that concept (e.g. Burge 1979; Schroeter and Schroeter 2009). (X)’s non-metalinguistic beliefs and abilities do not fix the extension of their concept elm. But, nonetheless, (X) must possess the elm concept since she has propositional attitudes with the content of that concept; a speaker cannot express the belief that <all elms are trees> without possessing the concept elm. Burge (1979) has forcefully argued that many of our concepts are deferential in this way: 

It would be a mistake […] to think that incomplete understanding […] is in general an unusual or even deviant phenomenon […] ‘Brisket,’ ‘contract,’ ‘recession,’ ‘sonata,’ ‘deer,’ ‘elm’ (to borrow a well-known example), ‘pre-amplifier,’ ‘carburetor,’ ‘gothic,’ ‘fermentation,’ probably provide analogous cases. Continuing the list is largely a matter of patience. The sort of ‘incomplete understanding’ required by the thought experiment includes quite ordinary, nondeviant phenomena. (35-36)

If many (if not all) ordinary concepts are deferential in this way, then there is reason to doubt that in order to count as competently possessing a concept, one must accept a specific range of beliefs and inferences in the sense required by the neo-descriptivist. The neo-descriptivist attempt to provide a unified account is therefore problematic because communication occurs without identifying a shared set of core beliefs or inferences. 
We might, instead, turn to an externalist view of concept possession, such as Jerry Fodor’s (1994; 1998; 2003; 2008). Fodor (1998) suggests that possessing a concept is constituted, in the main, by a nomological relation between mind and world (p.121); concept acquisition is a matter of “getting nomologically locked to the property that the concept expresses” (p.125). In effect, then, the content of a concept such as cup is given by it being locked to the property ‘being a cup’. When a subject comes across such a property, we acquire the relevant concept because our minds “lock to” the property in the world. From there we can generalize from those experiences, opening up a mental folder for the concept cup, which constitutes a subject’s ability to think about cups.​[6]​ Concept possession is not a matter of accepting a specific range of inferences or beliefs, then, rather it is simply a matter of having the ability to make accurate tokenings of one’s concepts.​[7]​ 
	On this theory of concept possession, whatever descriptive content I associate with the term cup, and whatever divergent descriptive content you associate, is by-the-bye since we are both locked to the same property of being a cup. What is communicated, then, is the property to which we refer, rather than the epistemic route through which we represent it. It is plausible, then, that thinkers can be locked to the same properties whilst entertaining vastly different representational contents. This view preserves the notion of univocity and substantive dispute over interpersonal variations since being in a nomic – or counterfactually supporting – relation with a specific property in the world is compatible with such differences. As long as two speakers co-refer, variation of representational content will not damage communication.   
	But this view is problematic. Most simply, it seems intuitively to be too coarse grained – it does seem, for example, that the utterances “water is clear” and “H2O is clear” are distinct. On the locking view, however, the utterances communicate precisely the same content.​[8]​ Relatedly, Georges Rey (1992) has argued against this view with what he calls the “fortuitous locking problem”. The kernel of his worry is that, if we pay no attention whatsoever to thinker’s representational content, then the nomic relationships in virtue of which we have the concepts we do (as well as the propositional attitudes and so on) will be largely opaque and subjectively inaccessible. And, hence, it is possible that we might stand in a nomic relationship with a property that is, intuitively, not the subject matter of our conversations. Rey (1992) suggests that “[i]nsofar as one is moved by standard externalist claims about the reference of terms, one supposes that they refer to whatever real phenomenon the people in one’s community are ‘getting at’ in their uses of the terms” (317). But, Rey (1992) goes on to say, the lockings must be fortuitous, otherwise, they would “not give rise to any meaning intuitions, they would not enter into cognitive deliberations, and, most importantly, they would not seem to figure in any cognitive psychological laws” (318). The concern is that purely covariational relations would not seem to safeguard against thinkers being linked up with properties that are not those to which we think we refer. The account threatens to make the reference-fixing facts both opaque and implausibly separate from rational inquiry. And, most importantly for our purposes, it threatens to make even co-reference untenable in communication, since there is no way of determining whether or not a speaker and her audience are locked on to the very same properties. 
In what follows, we suggest a route through these issues by developing a plausible basis for a unified account of communication, competence and reference-fixing. In doing so, we suggest ways to weaken the conditions upon communication suggested by neo-descriptivists. At the same time, we try to make the conditions upon reference-fixing more substantial than those suggested by proponents of the locking view. The suggestions here should not be taken to be fully articulated nor defended. Rather, they may be understood as indicative towards an area of research in which we argue that significant progress is possible.

2. a fix for the locking view?
In response to the above issues with locking view, we begin with a suggestion to the effect that reference-fixing conditions can be strengthened by establishing a more robust causal relation between concepts and their referents. In doing so, we appeal to Jesse Prinz’s (2002) semantic account, and in particular to his ‘actual incipient causes’ condition. In essence, our starting point is that communication requires a common ground across individuals. We treat these common grounds as ‘reducible’ to shared concepts. The view suggested here ascribes a major role to experience in concept learning, requiring a significant explanatory framework with respect to the way in which concepts may be understood to lock on to the same properties in the world. 

2.1. Actual Incipient Causes
The locking view attempts to account for communication by explaining concept possession in terms of law-like covariance between concepts and their referents. With this, we agree that covariational relations exhibit substantial advantages over neo-descriptivism with regards to securing communication. However, it is arguably the case that the conditions required for reference-fixing are more substantive than those provided by the locking view. Nonetheless, stronger reference-fixing conditions may be established by a more robust and explicit causal relation between a mental particular and its referent(s). To develop this latter suggestion, we align ourselves with Prinz’s (2002) semantic view. Prinz’s major claim is that in order for a concept to be locked on to a specific kind, an instance of this kind must feature as the actual incipient cause of the concept in question. Let us elaborate.
In accounting for the intentional content of concepts, Prinz suggests a hybrid theory, which combines elements of both etiology and covariance. Concepts have these properties (covariance and etiology) in virtue of being built out of perceptual representations stored in the appropriate locus in the mind. In turn, concepts are tokened in virtue of stored representations being tokened. In this sense, in order for a concept c to refer to some property x, the following two conditions have to fulfilled: 

a)	x’s nomologically covary with tokens of c (Nomological Covariance clause).
b)	An x was the (actual) incipient cause of c (Etiology clause).

Prinz borrows the nomological covariance clause from Fodor. Moreover, the etiology clause also bears similarity with Fodor’s causal semantics. However, Prinz departs from Fodorian semantics by adopting a more sophisticated etiology element, which we examine presently. 
Prinz’s etiology condition also resonates with Dretske’s (1981) ‘Learning Period’ argument. Dretske treats the early stages of concept learning as a critical period – ‘learning period’. During this critical learning period a concept is applied very carefully and the things that would cause a concept to be tokened during that critical period constitute the concept’s semantic content. After this learning period, the concept is applied with less care and in this sense things other than the concept’s referents may token it. However, the properties that cause the concept in question to be tokened after this period no longer necessarily count as the concept’s referents. For, these properties would not have caused the concept at hand to be tokened during the critical learning period when the concept was carefully applied. To use a famous example, only horses would token the concept horse during the learning period, even though cows-on-a-dark-night might token it after that.​[9]​
Prinz differentiates his view from Dretske’s by arguing that a concept’s content can be identified with those things that actually caused the first tokenings of the concept in question, rather than by what would have caused them (Prinz, 2002: 250). In this way, when one forms horse as a result of perceptual encounters with horses, horse refers to horses, and horses alone, even though it can also be tokened when one sees cows-on-a-dark-night. 
In light of Prinz’s ‘hybrid’ semantic account (etiology & covariance), nomological covariance alone does not suffice to fix reference. But coupled with the aforementioned etiology condition, nomological covariance allows one to account for how it is that different individuals/speakers are appropriately locked on to the same set of properties. This suggestion helps to overcome Rey’s aforementioned concerns. For, lockings, on Prinz’s, view are not fortuitous (at least not in the way that Rey suggests). Of course, we grant that different individuals undergo different idiosyncratic (learning) experiences. Nevertheless, different individuals will still lock-on to the very same properties in the world, where an instance of a given kind has been the actual incipient cause of the appropriate concept. In this sense, the explanatory framework involving actual incipient causes sheds light on reference-fixing facts, allowing for co-reference  (i.e. different individuals referring to the same property), and, in turn, contributing towards safeguarding communication. Simply put, the same etiological story occurs for different speakers, and in this way securing a form of referential stability. 
However, establishing co-reference of single concepts does not suffice to secure communication. For, recall from §1 that it is possible for speakers to possess the same concept, and thus engage in univocal conversation about a subject matter, whilst assenting to substantively diverging descriptive meanings. Thus, in addition to an account of how different individuals are able to lock on to the same properties, successful communication still requires a story operating at the level of cognitive content.​[10]​ Differently put, if concepts are the building blocks of thoughts, then securing communication requires us to account for the ways in which different subjects deploy concepts in their subjects’ mental economies. 

3. Neo-descriptivism & Concept Individuation Conditions
In this section, we suggest a set of conditions on communication that are substantially weaker than those required by the neo-descriptivist. Namely, we argue that partial overlap between the constituent parts of a given concept of different individuals suffices to establish grounds for communication. We couch these minimum conditions for communication in terms of conceptual individuation conditions and cognitive content, and argue that statistical co-occurrence of properties across instances of a given kind allows for shareability of concepts. Crucially, concept shareability must be flexible enough to allow for both interpersonal variations and potential communication breakdowns.
There are two major views attempting to account for concept individuation in terms of the ways in which concepts are tokened in a subject’s mental economy. The first is a Lockean view according to which concepts become activated in virtue of activation of a representational core (1690/1975). The second derives from Hume’s (1739/1978) and Berkeley’s (1710/1957) writings, and was more recently taken up by Prinz (2002) and Barsalou (1999). Here concepts are seen as activated in virtue of representations of particulars. There are advantages and disadvantages for both. For example, those arguing for a representational core have at their disposal a readily usable way to account for stability and shareability of concepts. However, representational cores are most often taken to be the output of an abstraction process, and abstraction processes have been, and still are seen as problematic, to say the least.​[11]​ On the other hand, those suggesting that concepts become activated in virtue of activating representations of particulars have the advantage that representations of particulars are readily usable in accounting for concept individuation – concepts are simply tokened in virtue of activating a representation of a particular. However, it is not clear how views of this kind could account for type-concepts, given that all concepts are allegedly individuated in terms of representations of particulars.​[12]​ Furthermore, not all views in this tradition can account for conceptual stability and shareability.​[13]​ 
More precisely, Locke argues that we represent types in virtue of a general idea or an abstracted representation of the category as a whole. Given that we only have experiences with particular instances, Locke argues that general ideas are the output of what he calls an abstraction process (see below), in virtue of which we move beyond the details of particular instances. Locke  (1690/1975: II 11 9; III 3. 6-9) distinguishes between two abstraction processes, one through sensation and one through reflection. The former regards online perception of specific aspects, properties or features of a perceived object, e.g. the whiteness of a piece of chalk, while the latter concerns noticing a similarity across stored representations of instances. To put it in more contemporary terms, the whiteness between stored representations of a piece of chalk and snow. 
Locke’s suggestions on abstraction were famously criticised by Berkeley (1710/1957) who argues that there is an inherent contradiction in Locke’s account.  Specifically, given that Locke takes concepts/ideas to be picture-like mental images of the world, Berkeley argues that an image cannot represent all members of a given category by resemblance. Thus, argues Berkeley, there are no representations that exhibit the kind of generality for which Locke argues. The reason for that is that there is no such thing as abstractness in the semantic sense and thus that there are no ideas that can be general in their signification.
In addition to the problems traditionally associated with them, Abstraction models (AMs) have also come under fire recently for being incoherent (e.g. Hendriks-Jansen 1996). Further criticisms concern the difficulties in specifying the content of an abstraction, that AMs cannot handle deviations and non-regularly potentially crucial occurring features (see Barsalou 1995 for a detailed discussion). Largely, AMs are still seen as untenable. 
The traditional alternative to (Locke’s) Abstraction model is to appeal to an idea’s functional role or the way in which a given idea is deployed in a subject’s mind. More specifically, Berkeley (1710/1957: Intro) argues that ideas can be used as exemplars of all members of a given category. For instance, a representation of a particular triangle could be used as an exemplar of all triangles. In more contemporary terms, the idea is that type concepts can be mapped onto more than one thing (tokens) in terms of the way they are deployed in thought processes (functional role). In a similar fashion, Hume (1739-1740: I 1 7) argues that ideas represent things in the world by virtue of their functional or causal role and through the production of mental effects and dispositions. To this extent, two identical ideas might actually refer to different things by virtue of their different usages in a subject’s mental economy. For instance, the idea of a red ball might sometimes be used to represent the category of red balls, at other times the category of balls, and yet at other times the category of all red things. The key claim here is that we do not need to posit lack of specificity in the intrinsic (imagistic) qualities of the image in order to explain reference to general categories such as ‘all red things of any kind’. An idea’s functional and causal role does that. 
Even though views appealing to ideas’ functional roles exhibit certain discriminative advantages in comparison to traditional AMs, they also face shortcomings. For instance, such views are susceptible to two versions of Devitt and Sterelny’s (1987) famous ‘Qua-problem’. Consider first a given particular, say apple a. Apple belongs to many different categories, the category of fruit, the category of edible things, the category of nutritious foods, and so forth. At times, a subject can use a as a stand-in for all fruit or as stand-in for the category of fruit at other times. Here it is not clear what will determine the intended extension. Normally, a way to clarify the determinants of the intended extension is to acknowledge that a specific extension is part of a general’s idea content, and it is its content that fixes which general idea it is, i.e. apple or fruit. However, given that the idea of apple is distinct from that of fruit, the problem becomes more pressing for cases of thoughts like ‘All apples are fruit’. Thus, it seems that the way a given idea will be deployed at a given time needs to be decided prior to using it as a stand-in for a given category. The extension of a general given idea is not pre-fixed. 
A different version of the same problem is that a representation of water, for instance, could be used both as a stand-in for water and H2O. Even though their extensions are the same, the ideas of water and H2O are distinct. And even in the case where the set of instances is adequately fixed by inferring from the stand-in for H2O, it is still not clear how the class was conceived. Thus, the extension of a general idea alone does not suffice to account for how concepts are individuated. Concepts (or general ideas) are individuated in a more fine-grained way. The view suggested here about concepts being individuated by virtue of a representational core avoids these shortcomings. Specifically, it avoids the intensional version of the Qua problem since it does not appeal to the functional role of a particular idea. Concerning the extensional version, thinking of the category <Apple> occurs in virtue of deploying an abstracted structured representation of an apple, while thinking of the category <Fruit>, by deploying an abstracted representation carrying information about nutritious edible things growing in trees or something of that sort. In this sense, according to the suggested view both sub-kinds and super-kinds have a unique (abstracted) representation with fixed extensions. Thus, in the case of the thought “Apple is a fruit”, two different representations will be deployed. Regarding the intensional version, the ideas water and H2O are distinct to the extent that they are structured from representations carrying information about a tasteless, odourless liquid and about a specific chemical constitution respectively. This is the case since the idea H2O is formed on the basis of experiences with chemical formulas, rather than instances of water (alone).  See also (________) for a detailed discussion of related issues. 
The view of concept individuation suggested here attempts to combine the virtues of both accounts whilst avoiding these obvious pitfalls. It is worth clarifying that despite appealing to Prinz’s semantic account and principles about the nature of concepts, the suggested view about concept individuation clearly departs from Prinz’s suggestions. The main difference is that here we treat concepts as tokened in virtue of a representational core. To this extent, the suggested view is genuinely Lockean in nature, unlike Prinz’s who appeals to the functional role of particular ideas similarly to Hume. The main similarity is that in addition to the representational core, we allow enough flexibility for representations of particulars to be activated alongside this representational core. 

3.1 Formation of a representational core
In order to fully appreciate the nature of the representational core, which plays a crucial role in the ways concepts becomes individuated and in turn for the process of communication, we start by illustrating the process by virtue of which representational cores are formed. This formation process of is essentially the process of concept acquisition, as shown below. By and large, a representational core is an abstracted representation that shares enough similarities with all members of a given category. It is these overlapping similarities across all members of a given kind that secure reference, which in turn provides the ground for communication. Given the crucial role that reference plays in communication, recall that we align ourselves to Prinz’s semantic account, which builds upon covariance as a precondition for reference. Furthermore, having a semantic account helps signposting the process of formation of the concept’s representational core. That is, the endpoint of this formation process is the point at which the representational core covaries in a lawlike fashion with instances of a given kind (i.e. all instances of a given kind cause the concept at hand to become activated).​[14]​

3.2. Background commitments
3.2.1. Top-down effects in perception
One of the major commitments of the present view is that there are top-down effects in perception. As shown below, we take these effects to play a significant role in concept formation and learning. Despite that top-down effects in perception are widely accepted, there are also opposing views in the extant literature. For instance, it is often argued that cognition does not affect vision directly but only produces top-down effects indirectly through attention and decision-making (e.g. Pylyshyn, 1999 and Fodor, 1983). The view suggested here bears similarities with Elman and McClelland’s (1985) ‘Trace Model’ according to which a perceptual input activates a number of similar representations, a matching process occurs and various competing – similar to each other – representations influence perception of the inputting signal. 

3.2.2. Systematic Properties of Perceptual Systems
The final preliminary issue on which we elaborate here concerns the systematic properties of our perceptual systems. For given the empiricist character of the suggested view, and in order for the experiential input to play the role we suggest that it does in our cognitive lives, perceptual systems need to be sophisticated enough systems to deliver representations with such systematic properties. 
Barsalou (1999) argues that selective attention isolates information and focuses on salient features of objects as well as on the relations between these features. Representations of attended parts and features of perceived objects become stored in long-term memory. In turn, stored representations become integrated spatially using an object-centred reference frame, which becomes informationally enriched in light of subsequent encounters with instances of the same kind. Building upon Barsalou’s suggestions we argue that representations of encounters with subsequent instances enrich the appropriate existing frame by virtue of top-down effects. We elaborate on this issue in detail below. 
Despite that Barsalou offers an extremely helpful account about the modus operandi of our perceptual systems, there are two things in his account that need further amplification, before this suggestions could be used in concept formation. First, it is not clear in Barsalou’s view at which point one could talk about reactivation of an existing representation or reactivation of a new one. For given that our target here is to establish the aforementioned nomic relation between a given stored representation and all instances of a given kind, it needs to be clarified how the original representation exhibits this kind of generality (to paraphrase Berkeley’s aforementioned critique against Locke). The problem in this case is that the original instance of a given kind might have been a very atypical one. Thus, the required nomic relation would have never occurred. Unless of course what Barsalou suggests echoes Hume, Berkeley’s and more recently Prinz’s suggestions that a representation of a particular is used as a stand-in for the category at hand. In either case, the view presented below is a genuinely Lockean alternative to such views.
Second, and as Barsalou acknowledges, despite that selective attention primarily controls what becomes stored in long-term memory, some non-attended information also becomes stored. Non-attended information, most probably originating in peripheral vision, is often non-overlapping information amongst members of a given category. In turn, this non-overlapping information might compromise establishing the aforementioned nomic relation between mind (concepts) and world. Thus, eliminating this non-overlapping information greatly contributes to securing reference. 

3.2.3. Encounter with the first instance of a given kind
As already explained, the representational core of concepts is formed in virtue of an abstraction process. This process starts with formation of perceptual representations of particular instances of a given category and produces as output a representation that exhibits a nomic relation between all members of a given category. In this sense, it represents that category as a whole (but is not yet a concept as it is not endogenously controllable).​[15]​ Essentially, during the abstraction process the overlapping similarities between representations of particulars are selected and are used to form an abstracted representation (representational core) while the non-overlapping information is simply ignored. Consider the following example of forming the representational core for the concept of a tree. 
On perception of the first instance of a tree, a schematic symbol of the tree’s overall shape is formed. This selection process is initially driven by salience and later on by salience and top-down effects as shown preserntly. For Barsalou (1999), it is selective attention that isolates features like it’s trunk, branches and leaves to continue with the same example. The representations of the attended features are stored in long-term memory, alongside (representations carrying) information about their part-whole and part-to-part relations. This frame of information, as Barsalou calls it, becomes informationally enriched in virtue of representations formed during encounters with subsequent instances of trees. Spatial representations establish the skeleton of the frame, while representations of parts flesh out its details. 

3.2.4. Encounter with the second instance of the same kind
Resonating Dretske’s (1981) ‘learning period’ argument, the process described in this paragraph concerns very careful identification of a given instance as similar to a previously experienced one. As a result, no non-trees are recognised as instances of the category <Tree>, as well as a number of trees to which the agent does not attend are also passed by as non-trees. In a similar fashion to the first encounter, during encounter with the second instance of a tree, a representation of the overall shape is formed. Given similarities across instances of trees, the representations of the subsequent instance will bear similarities to the ones formed and stored during the original experience. Crucially, these two (sets of) representations are alike, at least partly, because the formation of the second representation is partly influenced by the stored first representation in a top-down manner. Specifically, on perception of the second tree, a representation is formed, and is matched with the already stored representations of the first encounter. As a result, the spatially integrated set of symbols for the first tree is retrieved and drives selective attention on the same parts of the second tree that have been attended to during the first encounter with a tree. Thus, the subject focuses on the same salient parts such as the tree’s trunk, branches, leaves, etc. across encounters with both instances and a series of representations of the attended parts is formed. It is in this way that stored representations drive perception (of the subsequent instance in this case) in a top-down manner. These top-down influences occur inside a process all of which is preconceptual. A further implication of matching stored information (representation) with occurrent information is that this retrieved information drives storage of occurrent information in the same locus in the subject’s mind. Consider this locus in terms of Perry’s (2001) mental files metaphor. 
Given the aforementioned top-down influences, selectively attended features tend to be overlapping features across different instances of a given kind, while non-attended features are more likely to be non-overlapping features. Not surprisingly, co-occurring features are (the most) salient features.​[16]​ 

3.2.5. Acquisition via abstraction 
After a series of encounters with instances of trees, a number of perceptual representations are stored in the subject’s mind. Crucially, none of these representations exhibits the covariance properties that Prinz assumes necessary for reference (nomic covariance). For they are representations of particulars that do not necessarily share enough similarities with all instances of a given category. This is the traditional problem of the origins of general ideas we briefly discussed above.
Information/representations stored in a given locus, is/are fed into an abstraction process (AP). Once a number of perceptual representations of instances of a given kind become stored in a given folder, an abstraction process (AP) is initiated. Information in a given folder plays the role of input to this AP. In addition to this quantitative criterion, there is also a qualitative threshold that needs to be surpassed. Namely, a suitably diverse range of representations must also be stored in the locus at hand. Given the aforementioned top-down effects, and the influence they have on storing representations of the same parts, these diverse representations carry information about different contextual features or non-selectively-attended features that nevertheless became stored.
The AP uses as input representations stored in a single locus in the subject’s mind. In order for a representation of a feature of a given object to be present in the output of the AP, it needs to be present in a certain proportion of the input representations. In this sense, AP is sensitive to similarities between members of a given set of stored perceptual representations. 
The suggested view does not appeal to a notion of similarity or of an independent criterion of sameness. Rather, the overlapping similarities within a set of representations, and the ones selected during the AP, are the most commonly occurring features within that set. The underlying hypothesis is that commonly co-occurring features are connected with stronger connections. At this point we appeal to Hebb’s famous rule of learning according to which ‘neurons that fire together, wire together’. Assuming a light-hearted reductionism, neurons that ground perception of co-occurring features will become strongly associated and so will the ‘corresponding’ representations. In this sense, the AP uses information carried by representations stored in a given locus in the mind that are connected with stronger connections. Hence, there is no need for any independent criterion of sameness to be in place. 

3.2.6. Properties of AP’s product
The output of the AP is an abstracted representation, what we called a concept’s representational core. This representational core is built out of representations of particular instances of a given kind. Despite the fact that perception occurs in a fragmented fashion, information about part-whole and part-to-part relations allows the representational core to be a representation of the perceived object as a whole.​[17]​ 
The output of the AP (representational core) is general in its signification in that it represents a category rather than a single particular instance. Crucially, the representational core represents a category that includes things that have not yet been amongst the perceived instances. For example, even instances of trees that the subject has not perceived yet will token her concept tree. In this sense, the representational core represents all instances of a given category (nomological covariance). Crucially, for present purposes, it is by virtue of the representational core that concepts becomes tokened and individuated in a way that facilitates communication by facilitating conceptual sharaebility and publicity as shown next. 
To project the above claims about the nature of the representational core of concepts to the issue of how communication occurs, consider that all views of communication should account both for conceptual flexibility and conceptual stability (across communication). In this sense, individuation conditions of concepts should be flexible enough to accommodate conceptual changes or enrichment (especially obvious in cases of scientific concepts like temperature, phlogiston, oxygen, etc.), whilst also being stable and sharable across individuals.
Concepts become tokened in virtue of activating a (set of) representation(s). For instance, tokening the concept tree occurs in virtue of activating the appropriate representational core or an abstracted representation of a tree carrying information about an entity with some sort of trunk, branches, possibly leaves, and so forth. Some of this information is captured in terms of the concept’s cognitive content, as explained below.​[18]​ 
When a given concept is tokened out of context or on the fly (for example, when we think of a category as a whole and/or do not selectively attend to specific aspects of the concept in question), then the concept in question is activated in virtue the concept’s representational core. When, on the other hand, a concept is tokened within a given context, a further representation (this time of a particular instance of the same kind) will additionally become activated alongside the representational core. 
Our suggestion is that interlocutors achieve communication in virtue of sharing a minimal set of abstracted representations (representational cores). There are two reasons why different subjects share the same set of representations. First, as already explained, representational cores are the output of abstraction processes and carry information about all instances of a given kind. That is, regardless of the instances that different subjects experienced, they will still share the representational core of their concept. For instance, all possessors of the concept tree will share representations that carry information for instance about presence of a trunk, branches and leaves. Furthermore, all possessors of tree will have this set of core representations given that an instance of a tree was the incipient cause of their concept tree.
Clearly, the suggested view bears certain similarities with the neo-descriptivist suggestions. However, unlike neo-descriptivist accounts what is shareable in the suggested view is a set of core representations and not of inferences. Let us flesh this idea further, by using the following example. Consider two subjects [X] who lives in Northern Europe and subject [Y] who lives in Sub-Saharan Africa, who both have the concept tree. Clearly, one would expect that there would be differences in their concepts of tree.  For subject [X] has experiences with very different instances of trees in comparison to subject [Y]. However, both of their concepts do refer to trees given that an instance of a tree was the incipient cause of their concept tree, and their concept tree nomologically covaries with instances of trees. Admittedly, by sharing a given concept subjects [X] & [Y] might also share a set of inferences. However, it is not a core of shared inferences that is anchoring these concepts as shared concepts. Rather these anchoring similarities are similarities across representations of tree properties. Even if there is an externalist story to be told about how inferential patterns existing in one’s linguistic community contribute to communication, having a set of core inferences is, in our view, neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for establishing communication. 
Having a shared set of core representations is necessary for interlocutors to communicate, even if they do not share any inferences. That said, given the same contextual features, cultural conditioning, physical environment etc., it is very rare that we do not share any inference with others. But having a shared set of core inferences is not a prerequisite for communication – having the same set of core representations is. This set of representations in turn influences individuation conditions and cognitive content of concepts (see also below).
The suggested semi-flexible individuation conditions greatly resemble elements of Prinz’s (2002) Proxytype Theory. To use one of Prinz’s examples, when thinking of a dog while in a small apartment, the concept of a DOG will be activated in virtue of activating (a) representation(s) of a Chihuahua or a different small breed dog. In contrast, when thinking of a dog while in the North Pole, the same concept will be activated in virtue of activating (a) representation(s) of a sledge-dog, for instance. For Prinz, the relation between proxytypes and concepts is of a type/token relation. To this extent, such variations between different proxytypes are not important for the relation between the proxytypes and the concept in question. Each of these proxytypes stands in a type/token relation to the type concept – the concept dog in the previous example. 
We note, however, that there are two points of departure from Prinz’s account. Recall that in Prinz’s view variations between different proxytypes are not important for the relation between the proxytypes and the concept in question; proxytypes stand in a type/token relation to the type concept. Furthermore, Prinz accounts for stability in terms of a default representation. Regarding accounting for flexibility, Prinz appeals to contextual features activating different representations. In the suggested view, we establish further conditions both for stability and flexibility of concepts. First, we argue that representations of particulars are activated only alongside the abstracted representation (representational core). That is, representations of particulars cannot be activated without the representational core being activated first, while the reverse does not hold – the representational core can be activated without a representation of a particular. Consider for instance cases where a concept is activated out of context or on the fly. Our motivation here is that having an abstracted representation tokened across different instantiations of a given concept provides an increased continuity and stability in comparison to Prinz’s aforementioned suggestions about default representations of particulars. Second, variations between different representations will play a lesser role than in the case of Proxytype Theory, since the representational core secures continuity across different instantiations of a given concept. Our target here is to secure flexible individuation conditions with the smallest possible implications in terms of stability. 
The claim that a given concept is always tokened in virtue of activating its representational core, allows us to accommodate for shareability. The claim that an additional representation is activated alongside the representational core of a given concept is targeted at accommodating conceptual flexibility.​[19]​ In addition, when tokening a given concept a representation of the appropriate word gets also activated. It is worth clarifying at this point that the abstracted representation is relatively informationally impoverished – at least in comparison to representations of particulars. Qua informationally impoverished, the representational core does not put high cognitive loads on the system when tokened, even in cases where an additional representation is forced by contextual features to become also activated.​[20]​
In a nutshell, concepts become tokened in virtue of activating the following representations. 
a)	The concept’s representational core.
b)	A representation of a particular instance of a given kind – depending on contextual drives. Unlike Prinz (2002), (b) plays only an auxiliary role in conceptual individuation.
c)	The representation of the appropriate word. 

The above suggestions about concept individuation are targeted at relaxing the conditions for communication that neo-descriptivists suggest. More specifically, only a partial overlap between the constituent parts of a given concept (a – c) should in principle suffice for different individuals to token the same concept. Despite being more relaxed than what neo-descriptivists suggest though, the above conditions for communication still imply that communication is always successful. Clearly, this is not the case. We turn to examine this issue next.

3.3. Interpersonal Variation
In the previous paragraphs, we suggested a ‘hybrid’ view of individuation conditions (stable representational core plus an additional representation of particular). An objector may consider this view to be, in some sense, just as strong as that proposed by the neo-descriptivist. For example, it may be charged that, even though we allow the additional representation of particulars (making some space for interpersonal conceptual variation), the representational core seems to be too stable to allow for communicational breakdowns. In this section, we clarify that the suggested view does allow for communicational failures even between possessors of concepts with the same intentional content or how possessors of the same concept might fail to communicate. One way to accommodate this problem is by appealing to external factors such as contextual drives, noise, differences in attentional focus between the speaker and the hearer, and so forth. Admittedly, external factors inevitably play a role in communicational breakdowns. However, in what follows we approach the issue of conceptual variations and in turn communicational breakdown in terms of cognitive content (connections between different concepts within a subject’s mental economy). It is worth clarifying at this point that cognitive content is also ultimately influenced by external factors. However, cognitive content refers to the connections between concepts formed throughout the subject’s lifespan. In this sense, cognitive content captures an indirect and more ‘diachronic’ bias of the subject to draw certain inferences (under certain circumstances). Our starting point is that cognitive content influences the inferences we are disposed to make from a thought deploying the relevant concept. We have elaborated on this claim in detail elsewhere  _________&_________). Briefly, our main suggestion is the following.
We treat concepts as structured entities built out of perceptual representations, which are well suited for forming associations between them. The frequencies of co-occurrence between different representations determine the association-weights between (sets of) representations. Perhaps it would be useful to construe this is terms of classical conditioning (cf. Pavlov, 1927) or Hebbian learning (cf. Hebb, 1949). For instance, if a representation of x is strongly associated with a representation of y, the latter will become activated every time the former is activated. This claim is in line with priming data in perceptual speech analysis and rapid recognition of semantically coherent texts. More specifically, stronger connections between representations (of words in this case) underlie reliable dispositions between words like 'salt' & 'pepper', 'cat' & 'dog', - to use some well-rehearsed examples (cf. Fodor, 1983). In our view, such dispositions are grounded in stronger associations between different (representations and) concepts (cognitive content). Thus, we argue that inferential dispositions can be explained in terms of associations between representations/concepts. For instance, if a subject has a view of dogs as dangerous animals, and they encounter a dog, they may well infer that the animal is dangerous. This inferential ability can be explained in terms of associations between the concept DOG and the concept DANGEROUS or representations of dogs and other dangerous animals or things. 
It is worth noting the similarities between the view suggested here and the neo-descriptivist suggestion that having inferential abilities allows a speaker to articulate the descriptive meaning associated with their terms. The difference to neo-descriptivist is that this ability is not bestowed upon a speaker simply in virtue of possessing the relevant concepts. In the view suggested here, possessing the appropriate concept is necessary in order to draw inferences but these inferences are couched in terms of cognitive content. In turn, cognitive content does not have to be shareable in order to secure communication. As explained, possession of concept, which does not necessarily entail possession of core inferences, is what secures communication. 
In the suggested view inter-conceptual and inter-representational connections (or our cognitive content) are conditioned by our experiences with our physical and sociocultural environments. Given that different individuals have different experiences, the weights of associations between different representations will naturally differ, in many cases to a significant degree. This variation in connection weights (and in turn in cognitive content) provides a plausible explanation of potential communicational breakdowns. More specifically, if two individuals’ cognitive content of a given concept differs, then each individual will be inclined to deploy the same concept in different ways.. For instance, it is intuitive to assume that a Northern European will be more inclined – in comparison say to a Sub-Saharan African – to infer that trees cover large areas. These inferences are captured in terms of associations between representations of a tree and representations of forests – in the case of the Northern European. Presumably, a Sub-Saharan African will have stronger associations between representations of trees as standalones and representations of vast sandy areas. 
The second part of our suggestion about how communication breaks down concerns a more direct role for external factors. In particular, we focus on the role that contextual features play in concept individuation. Let us elaborate. Communication is the outcome of reasoning processes that most often build upon intentions. If the cognitive content of concepts deployed in a certain stream of thought influences thinking, which as explained we assume that it does, it is also plausible to assume that variations in cognitive content could give rise to different thoughts in different individuals under different, and in many cases similar/the same, circumstances. As explained, variations in terms of cognitive content are easy to obtain given the infinite ways in which experiences of two individuals differ. Nevertheless, individuals do not often fail to communicate for communicational processes are almost always scaffolded by contextual, linguistic, cultural, and environmental factors, which are in turn captured in prefixed community-level inferential patterns (existing in a given linguistic and cultural community). 
One natural worry here is that the suggested view renders concepts holistically individuated. However, in this view concepts are only trivially holistic. In the suggested view, all concepts could be, technically speaking, connected with each other. However, it is only strong(er) connections that are cognitively interesting, to the extent that only strong(er) connections influence the way in which a given concept is individuated and enters inferences. In turn, the number of these stronger connections does by no means imply any kind of threatening holism. Furthermore, even though the suggested view of concepts might be seen as holistic in terms of inferences that subjects could draw, the core representations of concepts are not holistic in nature. For the meaning of concepts is determined by the incipient causes of a given concept (along with their covariance properties). To this extent, the meaning of concepts is not affected, let alone determined, by the inferences one could draw. For instance, even if subject A infers that all tables are made out of plastic, while subject B infers that all tables are made out of wood, this would not compromise their ability to communicate their thoughts about tables, since it would not affect what their respective concept table picks out in the world. By suggesting that it is not a core of shared inferences that is anchoring these concepts as shared concepts, we can avoid concerns about holism that neo-descriptivist accounts face.

4. Conclusion
In this paper, we suggested a way towards a unified account of communication, competence and reference-fixing. In doing so, we suggested a way to establish strong conditions upon reference-fixing (actual incipient causes) and in turn avoid the problems associated with the locking view. 
Furthermore, we suggested a way to relax the conditions upon communication that neo-descriptivism requires, and avoided the claim that there are inferences that one is disposed to make in accord with possessing a given concept, which are constitutive of meaning. In this way, concepts are more shareable across individuals and thus the suggested view contributes towards securing communication. At the same time, having more relaxed and flexible individuation conditions allows space for interpersonal variations and communicational breakdowns. Admittedly, the suggested view is by no means fully articulated or defended. However, taken together the above claims signpost a route through these issues by developing a plausible basis for a unified account of communication, competence and reference-fixing.
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^1	  The details of Jackson’s neo-descriptivism have been questioned elsewhere (e.g. Byrne and Pryor 2006; Block and Stalnaker 1999; Nimtz 2004), on the terms of his allegiance to a form of descriptivism. Though, to some extent these may miss the mark because of Jackson’s reformulation in terms of cognitive abilities.
^2	  See Chalmers and Jackson 2001 §3, Jackson 1998b, pp. 211-12, and for criticism Byrne and Pryor.
^3	  A second distinction with traditional descriptivism is that this kind of meaning does not constitute beliefs about the underlying properties themselves; rather it provides a “template” for identifying the underlying properties, which must then be filled in with the relevant a posteriori information in that context.
^4	  Consider, for example simple trolley cases involving a dispute between a Kantian and a Utilitarian. Whatever we say about this, it doesn’t seem correct to say this boils down to a difference in the concept right. Rather, it looks like it is possible to mean the same thing whilst accepting and endorsing a different (and incompatible) set of core inferences. One response here is to weaken the condition under which a thinker possesses a concept by drawing upon the machinery of Ramsay-Carnap sentences. The thought is that a thinker may be said to possess a concept only when they are committed to a Carnap sentence, which, essentially conditionalises existential sentences (and therefore do not, themselves, encode substantial commitments). However, this runs into similar problems, since, for the trolley case, for example, it makes no difference whether or not the inferences are defined in conditionalised form, as long as we agree that the two disputants both possess the same concept right.
^5	  Note that neither Putnam nor Kripke apply this sort of point to beliefs, rather this was Burge’s innovation.
^6	  See also Perry (2001).
^7	  See e.g. Rey (1983), p.258.
^8	  See also Kroon 2004 on this point.
^9	  This is Dretske’s solution to the disjunction problem. Briefly put, theories of content of representations should explain how it is that a given representation can misrepresent or how its content can be false of the object represented. For instance, our concept horse refers or represents horses even though it might be tokened by cows-in-a-dark-night.  The problem is that if cows-in-dark-night do cause our concept horse to get tokened, then there is no principled reason to say that horse refers to horses and not to either horses or cows-in-dark-night. The disjunction problem is particularly pressing for theories explaining content in terms of covariance (see above).
^10	  For example, a purely externalist view of content faces obvious difficulties regarding Frege cases, since it looks like any plausible account of communication ought to be able to differentiate between the communication of the ‘morning star’, and the ‘evening star’. We return to related issues in 3.2.
^11	  See Barsalou, (2005); and ________ for detailed discussions.
^12	  But see Hume 1739/1978 & Berkeley 1710/1957 for accounts of the functional role of ideas/concepts. See also ______,  for a critical review of such views. 
^13	  Note also that each of these kinds of views has different implications for the conceptual change/enrichment debate. However, further elaboration on this issue extends beyond the scope of the present paper.
^14	  Admittedly it might seem hard how the suggested view could account for concepts that do not pick out tangible entities. As shown elsewhere (__________), this apparent difficulty could be avoided by appealing to the role of language.
^15	  The underlying hypothesis here is that we have endogenous control over our production of linguistic items to the extent that we are in a position to produce linguistic utterances at will or silent talking to ourselves. It is this executive control over linguistic utterances that gives us endogenous control over our thoughts. We do not elaborate on this issue here but see __________ for a detailed discussion. 
^16	  In this sense, given top-down influences, there is no need for a perceptual bias that selects which representations will become stored in memory to exist innately. For, the representations becoming stored are representations that tend to co-occur with things in the world. In this sense, co-occurrence of a part is partly shaping the disposition in question.
^17	  With regards to the fragmented fashion in which perception occurs see amongst others Barsalou (1999); Findlay and Gilchrist (2003); Gazzaniga et al. (1998); Biederman (1987); Hochberg (1999); Goldstone (1994); Smith and Heise (1992). See also Damasio (1989) for a solution to the binding problem, the problem of objects are perceived as wholes rather than conjunctions of parts.
^18	  It is worth noting here that representations of things people normally do with objects (or the object’s (basic) typical affordances) are also included in the tree folder. For instance, representations of humans or animals climbing on a tree might well be included in the tree folder. The only precondition for these representations to be included in the appropriate folder is that they occur fairly frequently across experiences with instances of trees. A further way to represent, at least some, affordances of a given object is in terms of the concept’s cognitive content, e.g. in terms of connection between the concept tree and climb or solid object (see also below)Of course, frequencies of co-occurrences do not play the same role for all kinds of concepts. For instance, emotions are the kinds of representations that could speed up the acquisition process. It is intuitive to think that a subject will not have to go through the same painful experience more than once in order to acquire pain. 
^19	  Depending on the degree of the change in question there are significant (or less) significant changes at the concept’s cognitive content. For instance, the concept time of ancient Greeks was associated with concepts like cyclic, repetitive, etc. while in the Judeo-Christian tradition time is associated with concepts like linear, etc. Thus, in order to account for conceptual changes one has also to look into changes in a concept’s cognitive content, (see also below). 
^20	  The role of natural language in cognition is crucial and is especially vivid in the case of acquisition of abstract concepts, e.g. democracy. Even though accounting for the role of language in cognition extends beyond the scope of this paper, our view is that abstract concepts are tokened in virtue of perceptual representations of words. What is also crucial for the ways in which abstract concepts are deployed in thinking is their functional role. This role is often captured in terms of the inferential patterns with which (abstract) concepts are associated in a given linguistic community. In turn, a given concept’s cognitive content underlies these inferential patterns. (See also ________&_______, for a detailed view of how cognitive content influence thoughts).
